Censored Network: Restrictions on #InternetVE
Political and media context
2025 has been marked by a deepening of state control mechanisms over information and communication in Venezuela, as well as a further closure of civic space. This is particularly critical given the censorship mechanisms imposed in 2024, which remain active.
The elections held in July 2024 marked a turning point, introducing new patterns of digital censorship during the handling of the electoral process and after election day, followed by repressive actions against critical voices—patterns that remain present in 2025.
Following those elections, limitations on journalistic practice and the work of social organizations intensified, characterized by disinformation campaigns and the systematic use of state media and official digital platforms to delegitimize independent actors.
In the period from the July 2024 presidential elections until a few weeks after the inauguration in January 2025, Venezuela experienced the greatest concentration of serious human rights violations in the digital environment, as documented in our report Control Networks: Digital Censorship and Repression in Venezuela’s Presidential Elections.
The presidential inauguration in January 2025 marked another milestone in the deterioration of online freedoms in Venezuela. Around the event, blocks were documented against public DNS servers, Canva, Telegram, and the website North Macedonia, as well as video platforms and social networks during sensitive moments and amid widespread rejection of the legitimacy of the electoral process.
During the first months of 2025, disinformation campaigns and digital harassment against journalists and critical media intensified, while government representatives monopolized narratives through state communication channels. This combination of technical censorship and media manipulation consolidated an environment of total informational control.
Later, during the regional (May 25, 2025) and municipal elections (June 27, 2025), similar patterns were repeated. VE sin Filtro recorded new blocks against election coverage websites, citizen observation platforms, and independent media accounts. Alongside institutional opacity and the lack of guarantees for media work, these blocks confirmed that digital censorship remains a power tool to control public narratives.
Digital censorship is combined with other forms of harassment, such as legal prosecution, public exposure of journalists and activists, and surveillance in both virtual and physical environments. This ecosystem of control has cumulative effects: the threat of retaliation, combined with technological and legal uncertainty, has consolidated self-censorship as a strategy for informational survival. Increasingly, journalists, media outlets, and citizens choose to silence or moderate their publications due to the risk of sanctions, blocks, or coordinated attacks.
Regarding the media ecosystem, it continues to be characterized by deep inequality: independent outlets with limited reach, radio stations taken off the air or prohibited from covering certain topics, regulatory and economic pressure, and internet blocks that censor virtually the entire independent media ecosystem.
At least 61 independent media outlets remain blocked, affecting more than 90 domains, in addition to restrictions on key applications such as X (Twitter), Signal, YouTube, TikTok, and Telegram—some of them temporarily. These measures intensify especially during politically relevant events, such as elections or protests.
In this context, documenting and monitoring digital censorship remains essential to make patterns visible, assign responsibility, support accountability demands, and build guarantees for the full exercise of human rights on the internet. The communication ecosystem is in a state of extreme vulnerability: censorship no longer depends solely on direct silencing strategies, but also on discretionary management of connectivity, systematic surveillance, and the normalization of fear as a tool of control.
Blocks and Digital Censorship in Venezuela
Digital censorship in Venezuela has escalated progressively and systematically over more than a decade. As citizens shifted public debate and news consumption to the internet, the State adapted its control and surveillance mechanisms to the digital environment, turning the web into a new space for social control.
The first signs of online censorship emerged around 2010, when blocks against news sites and platforms hosting content critical or inconvenient for those in power began. Since 2014, amid national protests, the government implemented an internet shutdown in Táchira state, additional media blocks, and, for the first time, a partial block of Twitter during peaks of unrest.
During the 2017 protests, digital control deepened. Massive blocks were recorded against major news portals and streaming news media. Since then, digital censorship has been consolidated as a state policy, executed with greater technical sophistication and sometimes accompanied by official narratives justifying blocks in the name of “national security” or “protection against hate campaigns.”
Between 2018 and 2020, censorship patterns diversified. They extended to widely used services and platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram through repeated short-term tactical blocks at key moments. In parallel, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and DNS blocks targeting independent media, NGO portals, and human rights documentation platforms were documented. At the same time, an ecosystem of surveillance, manipulation, and coordinated disinformation was deployed, combining technical censorship with digital harassment and criminalization of critical speech.
From 2021 onward, blocks became more frequent, reaching one of their most critical moments during the 2024 presidential elections and the 2025 regional and municipal elections.
Website blocks affect everything from major media outlets and human rights NGOs (including vesinfiltro.com) to pornographic pages and genuinely illegal content. These blocks are ordered by the Venezuelan government to internet providers, which depend on the National Telecommunications Commission (CONATEL) to continue operating. As a general rule, restrictions do not comply with international human rights standards: they lack transparency, judicial oversight, and any possible appeal mechanism.
| Category | Abbreviation | Sites blocked in 2025 | Currently blocked sites | Active blocked domains |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 166 | 135 | 237 | ||
| Anonymization and circumvention tools | ANON | 30 | 30 | 32 |
| E-commerce | COMM | 3 | 1 | 54 |
| Communication Tools | COMT | 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Culture | CULTR | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Economics | ECON | 2 | 2 | 4 |
| Social Networking | GRP | 4 | 2 | 10 |
| Hate Speech | HATE | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Hosting and Blogging Platforms | HOST | 15 | 0 | 0 |
| Human Rights Issues | HUMR | 10 | 9 | 10 |
| Miscellaneous content | MISC | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Media sharing | MMED | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| News Media | NEWS | 65 | 61 | 90 |
| Political Criticism | POLR | 16 | 15 | 20 |
| Pornography | PORN | 9 | 8 | 10 |
| Public Health | PUBH | 2 | 2 | 2 |
Social Networks and Messaging Apps
On August 8, 2025, one year passed since the blocking of the social network X (formerly Twitter) and the messaging app Signal in Venezuela—measures that remain active since their imposition on August 8, 2024.
That day, minutes after Nicolás Maduro publicly called for the blocking of X, providers acted immediately. CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, Inter, NetUno, Supercable, G-Network, and Airtek restricted access nationwide.
Simultaneously, Signal—widely used by journalists, activists, and human rights defenders for its privacy and encrypted communication—was also blocked. This decision came one day after Maduro himself stated that CONATEL had proposed blocking WhatsApp, exposing a deliberate intention to interfere with direct and private communication channels.
These blocks were joined by restrictions on communication platforms, especially in the context of the presidential inauguration.
Tik Tok
For one month (between January 7 and February 5, 2025), at least nine ISPs blocked TikTok in Venezuela.
The first restrictions appeared on January 7 via Supercable. By January 10, Cantv, Net Uno, Digitel, Movistar, G-Network, Inter, V-Net, and Airtek had joined.
Blocking methods varied: DNS (Inter, Supercable, Digitel), HTTPS/HTTP (Movistar, V-Net), and TCP/IP (CANTV, Net Uno, G-Network, Airtek). CANTV and Net Uno also applied DNS blocking.
The pattern showed daily occurrences between midnight and 7 a.m. (UTC-4), with some exceptions. One Net Uno block lasted nearly 16 days (383.15 hours), one Supercable block went on over more than 8 days (199 hours), and one CANTV block lasted three and a half days (85.88 hours), according to VE sin Filtro measurements.
Chart: Timeline of events in the TikTok case between January 7 and January 22, 2025. Source: VE Sin Filtro.
Chart: Timeline of events in the TikTok case between January 22 and February 5 2025. Source: VE Sin Filtro.
Canva
CANTV applied a DNS block against Canva, a major web-based design platform, for at least 12 hours on January 9, 2025, the day before the presidential inauguration.
The reason for the blocking is unknown, but it is possible that public links were circulating to politically themed materials designed or published on the platform.
Telegram
In January 2025, Telegram suffered a block in Venezuela affecting users of major ISPs –CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, Inter, G-Network and Airtek–. Interruptions began around January 10–11, coinciding with Nicolás Maduro’s inauguration amid political tension and severe information restrictions.
The block combined DNS filtering, IP blocking, and TCP/IP traffic restrictions, preventing access to the platform without VPNs. Telegram had also been blocked post-election in 2024, when mobile apps were unaffected but connections to telegram.org and web.telegram.org were disabled.
| DOMAIN | CATEGORY | Start date | End date | ISP Blocking Mechanism | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CANTV | Airtek | Digitel | Inter | Movistar | Netuno | Supercable | ||||
| signal.org | COMT | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| abs-0.twimg.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| abs.twimg.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| upload.twitter.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| video-0.twimg.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| video.twimg.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| api.twitter.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| pbs.twimg.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| twitter.com | GRP | 2024-08-08 | Activo | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| www.reddit.com | GRP | 2019-02-25 | Activo | HTTPS* | No | No | No | DNS | No | No |
| x.com | GRP | 2024-08-07 | Activo | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
 |
@VEsinFiltro vesinfiltro.com |
|||||||||
- The blocking event using this technique has ended and is currently inactive.
Media Outlets and Informational Websites
Currently, 61 news websites are blocked, censoring virtually the entire independent media ecosystem, including major national outlets and some international media. This has shattered freedom of expression and information, and compromised media sustainability by reducing website traffic.
This censorship is implemented through blocking 90 individual domains, as many outlets have used alternative domains to evade restrictions. While most blocks began in previous years, new ones have been documented in 2025.
noticias.com
In May 2025, a block was detected against all domains ending in “noticias.com,” applied by Digitel and Movistar. This type of block has unintended consequences, affecting legitimate sites using that extension.
The blocking of these domains reveals an intention to restrict access to news sites and uses DNS filtering, which consists of impeding domain name resolution to prevent users from accessing certain web pages. Such measures raise serious questions about the role and responsibility of internet service providers in implementing practices that limit freedom of information and access to news content.
EFE
On March 22, 2025, VE sin Filtro reported that the website of the Spanish news agency EFE had been blocked. Days earlier, it had been criticized on state television for publishing an interview with Magalli Meda, a Venezuelan political activist who served as head of María Corina Machado’s national campaign team, “Con Venezuela”.
The restriction was implemented in a coordinated manner and using different technical methods by the country’s main ISPs: CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, NetUno, Supercable, G-Network, Airtek, and Thundernet.
EFE is an international news agency with significant influence in Spanish-speaking communities, and its blocking not only limits citizens’ access to international information but also acts as a deterrent to local media outlets that may cover sensitive issues.
Punto de corte
On October 1, 2025, the digital media outlet Punto de Corte (puntodecorte.net) was blocked, affecting access through the main internet providers in Venezuela
The block was implemented progressively and in a coordinated manner by the providers CANTV, Movistar, Inter, NetUno, Airtek, ThunderNet, and G-Network, using different technical methods, including DNS, IP, and HTTP/HTTPS blocking. In the case of CANTV, it was an IP address block, while Movistar and Inter applied DNS blocking.
The director of the media outlet, Nicmer Evans, said that this measure constitutes retaliation for the outlet’s critical editorial line and its coverage of human rights, corruption, and freedom of expression issues.
In February 2020, Punto de Corte’s original domain (puntodecorte.com) was blocked after it published a report titled “CANTV in ruins.” That block, which is still active, is a DNS block applied by Venezuela’s main internet providers: CANTV, Movistar, Digitel, Inter, Supercable, and Movilnet.
These blocks are part of a systematic pattern of digital censorship affecting at least 61 media outlets, carried out by the Venezuelan state and characterized by opaque actions, without official notification, without public legal basis, and without appeal mechanisms. These practices seek to restrict the circulation of information and punish the exercise of journalism.
Censorship of Electoral Information
The elections of 2024 and 2025 were, once again, a sensitive issue for the government, leading to the blocking of websites belonging to transparency initiatives focused on the electoral results of the July 28, 2024 presidential election and the 2025 regional elections.
The vast majority of blocks in 2024, regardless of their content, occurred during the electoral campaign and after the National Electoral Council (CNE) published election results that were questioned both domestically and internationally, including by ideological allies of Nicolás Maduro in Latin America.
In 2024, Venezuelan authorities ordered the blocking of websites that published the results from polling station tally sheets collected by the opposition, and later the tally sheets themselves: elecciones2024venezuela.com, resultadospresidencialesvenezuela2024.com, ganovzla.com, resultadosconvzla.com.
They also blocked the website of María Corina Machado’s political movement, www.ventevenezuela.org, as well as the news and analysis website elecciones2024venezuela.com, when rumors circulated that polling station tally sheets would be published there. Both blocks occurred in July 2024, after the elections.
De Macedonia con Amor
On January 8, 2025, we documented the blocking of demacedoniaconamor.com shortly after the website was published. The site was part of a documentary project about the protests and repression following the presidential elections. It was blocked by at least eight internet service providers, including the largest ones, using a combination of techniques.
The site’s name ironically references the claim made by Venezuelan authorities that the CNE suffered an alleged cyberattack from North Macedonia, a claim for which no supporting evidence has been provided.
cne.voto
On May 25, we documented the blocking of cne.voto on CANTV and G-Network. This website calls for the publication of complete and authentic electoral results and includes a counter tracking the number of days of delay, which to date exceeds 470 days.
Macedonia del Norte
The website macedoniadelnorte.com is an independent transparency project on electoral results that began in 2024. It publishes images of polling station tally sheets from voting centers, many of them sourced directly from social media users at each polling location.
On May 13, 2025, this website was blocked, two days after the publication of regionales.macedoniadelnorte.com, which was also intended to facilitate transparency regarding the 2025 regional elections.
The block was implemented by at least eight major internet service providers using a combination of techniques. CANTV, Movistar, and G-Network implemented more than one blocking technique simultaneously.
Elections Without Official Information
The official website of the National Electoral Council (CNE) has been inaccessible throughout 2025, after the CNE itself disabled it in the context of the 2024 presidential elections. As a result, there was no official information channel for the renewal of regional and municipal authorities, both of which took place in 2025.
Unlike traditional blocks carried out by internet service providers (ISPs), in this case it is the CNE itself that has decided to keep its website offline—a fact technically confirmed by VE sin Filtro.
Access to electoral information, board decisions, and complete official voting results is fundamental. This omission constitutes a serious breach of the CNE’s institutional duty to guarantee public access to relevant information.
The blocking started after the 2024 presidential elections, when the site’s IP addresses ceased to be accessible from international connections and from some Venezuelan ISPs—a decision implemented within the State’s network infrastructure. Subsequently, the CNE itself removed the DNS records necessary to resolve the IP addresses of www.cne.gob.ve
In addition, previously known IP addresses for this website no longer respond. Depending on the IP address and the network from which it is queried, the site is either completely inaccessible or does not respond at all and no longer hosts the website.
This situation seriously compromises the transparency of electoral processes in Venezuela. Citizens cannot access official results or key information about election day, violating their fundamental right to be informed.
In a context where information blocks have become common, the case of the CNE portal sets an even more alarming precedent: it is no longer a case of imposed censorship, but rather institutional self-censorship that erodes the legitimacy of the democratic process.
Restrictions on Censorship Circumvention Tools
The Venezuelan government has intensified blocks against censorship circumvention tools, including VPNs, the Tor network, and public DNS services. These measures directly affect citizens’ ability to access information and participate in online communities safely and freely.
During the early hours of January 9, 2025, Venezuela’s main internet service providers blocked the websites of at least 21 VPN services, along with additional ones blocked in previous days, with the aim of preventing their use in the country. This adds to pre-existing blocks targeting censorship circumvention mechanisms and VPNs.
Although most of these tools continue to function despite the blocks, in some reported cases the VPN service or some of its features were affected to varying degrees. As on previous occasions, these restrictions were ordered by CONATEL.
| DOMAIN | CATEGORY | Start date | End date | ISP Blocking Mechanism | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CANTV | Airtek | Digitel | Inter | Movistar | Netuno | Supercable | ||||
| nordvpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-07 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | No | DNS |
| pandavpnpro.com | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | No | DNS |
| www.betternet.co | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS* | No |
| www.urban-vpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-08 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| psiphon.ca | ANON | 2020-11-13 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP + HTTPS* | No | No | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| hide.me | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| mullvad.net | ANON | 2025-01-10 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| speedify.com | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS | HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | No |
| strongvpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-10 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| torguard.net | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| ultravpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| www.cyberghostvpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| www.hola.org | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | No | No |
| www.ipvanish.com | ANON | 2025-01-07 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS* | DNS |
| www.purevpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-07 | Activo | DNS + TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS* | DNS |
| www.zoogvpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS | HTTPS | DNS | DNS | No | DNS | No |
| brave.com | ANON | 2025-01-07 | Activo | No | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| bridges.torproject.org | ANON | 2025-01-07 | Activo | No | No | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| www.browsec.com | ANON | 2025-01-09 | Activo | DNS | No | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | No |
| www.expressvpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-06 | Activo | No | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | No |
| www.hotspotshield.com | ANON | 2025-01-06 | Activo | TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS* | No |
| www.itopvpn.com | ANON | 2025-01-08 | Activo | No | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | No | DNS | No |
| www.torproject.org | ANON | 2025-01-06 | Activo | TCP IP | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| surfshark.com | ANON | 2025-01-06 | Activo | No | No | DNS | DNS | No | DNS | No |
| vpn-api.proton.me | ANON | 2024-08-22 | Activo | No | No | DNS | DNS | No | No | No |
| www.vpnsuper.com | ANON | 2025-01-08 | Activo | No | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| tunnelbear.com | ANON | 2019-02-18 | Activo | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS* | No | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| protonvpn.com | ANON | 2024-07-20 | Activo | DNS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS |
| windscribe.com | ANON | 2024-07-31 | Activo | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS | HTTP/HTTPS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS | DNS |
| www.hidemyass.com | ANON | 2022-09-16 | Activo | No | No | No | No | No | DNS | No |
| api.tunnelbear.com | ANON | 2021-11-03 | Activo | DNS + HTTP/HTTPS* | No | No | No | DNS | DNS | DNS |
|
@VEsinFiltro vesinfiltro.com |
|||||||||
- The blocking event using this technique has ended and is currently inactive.
Internet censorship has also affected public DNS servers, which are necessary to circumvent blocks. CANTV blocked at least 33 public DNS servers using a TCP/IP block, including the best known ones such as Google Public DNS (8.8.8.8) and Cloudflare’s 1.1.1.1. These public DNS servers are an alternative to the DNS servers of internet providers themselves, which are often slower and facilitate censorship. These blocks ended on January 11.
From July 4, 2024, to January 31, 2025, VE sin Filtro documented 58 new cases of internet blocking targeting censorship circumvention tools: 26 VPN service websites, the Tor Project, and 30 public DNS servers.
| DOMAIN | CATEGORY | Start date | End date | ISP Blocking Mechanism | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CANTV | Airtek | Digitel | Inter | Movistar | Netuno | Supercable | ||||
| 1.0.0.1 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 1.1.1.1 | ANON | 2025-01-04 | Activo | TCP IP | No | No | No | TCP IP | No | TCP IP* |
| 8.8.4.4 | HOST | 2025-01-08 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 8.8.8.8 | HOST | 2025-01-08 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 149.112.112.112 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 156.154.70.1 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 156.154.71.1 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 199.85.126.10 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 199.85.126.20 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 199.85.126.30 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 199.85.127.10 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 199.85.127.20 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 199.85.127.30 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 205.171.2.65 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 205.171.3.65 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 208.67.222.220 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 208.67.222.222 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 216.146.35.35 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 216.146.36.36 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 4.2.2.1 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 4.2.2.2 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 4.2.2.3 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 45.90.28.230 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 64.6.64.6 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 64.6.65.6 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 77.88.8.8 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 8.20.247.20 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 8.26.56.26 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 84.200.69.80 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 84.200.70.40 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 9.9.9.9 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 94.140.14.14 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
| 94.140.15.15 | HOST | 2025-01-09 | 2025-01-11 | TCP IP* | No | No | No | No | No | No |
|
@VEsinFiltro vesinfiltro.com |
|||||||||
- The blocking event using this technique has ended and is currently inactive.
Blocking of Movie and TV Piracy Platforms
In March 2025, a judge from the state of Zulia (western Venezuela) ordered CONATEL to block 198 domains and URLs related to Magis TV and Flujo TV, piracy apps that operate via IPTV and streaming.
VE sin Filtro documented the blocking of 52 of the domains included in the judge’s order after it became public on March 26. Unusually, in this case the court’s decision was made public, whereas most internet blocking actions are carried out without a court order and amid absolute opacity, despite the fact that these actions violate the guarantees for the exercise of human rights.
MagisTV and FlujoTV are apps that offer access to audiovisual content such as movies, series, and live television over the internet (IPTV). These platforms do not hold rights to the content they provide, thereby infringing copyright. Because they operate illegally, these apps are not available in official app stores. Instead, the service is marketed by various groups, and the apps can be downloaded as APKs from different websites, some of which include malicious software.
Platforms with information on dollar exchange rates remain silenced
The Venezuelan government has intensified its actions against those it accuses of negatively influencing the economy.
Since May 20, 2025, at least 50 digital platforms—including mobile apps, websites, social media accounts, and messaging groups—changed their behavior and stopped publishing exchange rates different from the one set by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV).
Two websites were blocked by several ISPs, three were taken offline by their administrators and are unavailable, even outside Venezuela. Additionally, eleven websites were identified that, although still active, have not been updated or decided to publish only the reference dollar price established by the BCV. One website applied geographic restrictions so as not to be accessible in Venezuela.
At least 16 Instagram accounts stopped publishing “parallel dollar” exchange rates, and one of them was deleted. Three Telegram channels also stopped publishing dollar prices different from the BCV rate.
VE sin Filtro found that five apps mainly used to check, calculate conversions to the “parallel dollar,” or facilitate exchanges stopped offering these functions and no longer published different exchange rate indicators. In addition, their calculator stopped working.
Similarly, one app that facilitated the buying and selling of cryptoassets with bolívares applied geographic restrictions so that it would not function in Venezuela, and another stopped offering an exchange rate different from the official one.
Impact on freedom of expression and digital rights
The exercise of freedom of expression through digital media is enshrined in binding and guiding international instruments. The American Convention on Human Rights (Art. 13) recognizes the right to “seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers” and expressly prohibits prior censorship.
Similarly, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires that any restriction on the right to freedom of expression must be established by law, pursue a legitimate aim (such as national security, public order, or the rights of others), and be proportionate to the aim pursued.
Within the Venezuelan regulatory framework, Article 57 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela guarantees the right to freedom of expression, and Article 58 guarantees the right to accurate and impartial information.
However, this constitutional protection is being eroded by a set of laws, regulations, and technical measures that restrict the digital space without meeting standards of transparency, independent oversight, or effective recourse. For example, the Anti-Hate Law empowers the State to block websites if, in its opinion, they promote “hatred or intolerance,” with penalties of up to 20 years in prison.
By systematically blocking independent media outlets, human rights organization websites, fact-checking platforms, and tools for circumventing censorship, the state drastically reduces media plurality. This undermines citizens’ right to access diverse and reliable information, which is essential for legitimate public debate.
By preventing or hindering access to encrypted communication tools and censorship circumvention services (VPN, Tor), the risks of surveillance, intimidation, and self-censorship are increased. In this context, journalists, human rights defenders, activists, and critical citizens adopt self-censorship as a mechanism of self-protection against possible reprisals, which restricts the actual exercise of freedom of expression.
There is a differential impact: the most vulnerable groups —independent journalists, small media outlets, human rights organizations, rural or low-income communities— face a double barrier: first, being excluded from traditional media; second, suffering technical or economic impediments to accessing the digital space. This widens the digital rights gap and deepens inequality in access to communication and information.
From the perspective of elections and civic engagement, digital censorship hinders the right to public information on key processes, such as elections. When the electoral body’s website remains inaccessible and critical or independent media are blocked, control of the narrative remains in the hands of the state or affiliated entities, which affects the right to informed voting, transparency, and accountability.
The use of blocks that are not subject to judicial oversight and without effective recourse also violates the international principle of proportionality and judicial protection. Independent technical sources show that in Venezuela, digital content blocks are applied without public procedures or clear review criteria, which violates international standards.
Given this scenario, technical documentation of blocks and monitoring of digital censorship strategies are not limited to technical reading: they are key tools for the defense of human rights. By highlighting the extent of restricted access, they enable the formulation of strategies for resistance and legislative and judicial advocacy to demand that the Venezuelan state comply with its international and constitutional obligations. They also open up spaces for accountability, the construction of memory about digital abuses, and the promotion of public policies for digital inclusion.
Importance of monitoring digital censorship
Systematic monitoring of digital censorship is essential to understanding how the Venezuelan state intervenes in the online information ecosystem. In a context where traditional media face pressure, closures, and editorial control, technical observation and independent verification of internet traffic make it possible to identify content blocking and manipulation that would be impossible to identify without empirical evidence.
The work of VE sin Filtro has demonstrated that digital censorship in Venezuela is not sporadic, but part of a sustained policy of information control. This practice combines direct intervention by internet service providers—mostly under state control or regulatory coercion—with disinformation campaigns, surveillance, and digital harassment of critical voices. Technical documentation of blocks on media, platforms, and services has provided concrete evidence of how the state apparatus uses digital infrastructure as an extension of its political censorship mechanisms.
Monitoring is not only valuable from a technical standpoint. It is also a fundamental tool for the defense and promotion of human rights. Each measurement and each record becomes verifiable evidence that supports complaints to national and international bodies, feeds accountability mechanisms, and contributes to the pursuit of justice in cases of violations of the right to freedom of expression. The systematization of these findings also feeds into the construction of collective memory, preserving the trail of technological abuses and digital silencing strategies used against citizens.
Monitoring also contributes to the development of coping and resilience strategies in the face of the closure of civic space. It allows for the development of technical, educational, and communication tools that help journalists, media outlets, and users evade blockades, protect their information, and sustain the circulation of content of public interest. In this sense, monitoring not only documents censorship: it also empowers society to resist it, adapt, and continue communicating.
Ultimately, monitoring digital censorship serves a dual purpose: it highlights the extent of state control over the information environment and preserves the minimum conditions for exercising freedom of expression on the internet.
Methodology
We consider internet blocking to be a technical measure implemented to prevent access to a service, website, or web page, or information on the internet, by interfering with internet traffic, provided that they meet the criteria of VE sin Filtro:
- It is observable and technically measurable.
- It is consistent over time and at different points of access to the network, or part of it (even if the blocking rate is less than 100%).
- Other explanations, such as a technical failure, can be ruled out.
Internet blocks that last for a very short time, typically hours or minutes, coordinated to coincide with specific events and limit their visibility in real time, are called tactical blocks. Sites, services, or servers that are inaccessible as a collateral result of the intentional blocking of a different target are classified as collateral blocks.
In this report, we distinguish between blocked sites or services, for example, Google Search, and blocked domains, for example, www.google.com, www.google.com.ve, or images.google.com.
To document the blocking of websites and services on the internet, the report uses a combination of network measurements taken using OONI Probe, the network monitoring software from the Open Observatory of Network Interference, along with other network tests and measurements to strengthen the validation of findings and understand the implementation of censorship in greater detail.
The OONI web connectivity test is designed to detect blocking through DNS manipulation, whether a TCP connection is being prevented by IP blocking or TCP request blocking, and web request blocking. Comparing between the perspective of the connection studied and the control.
Censorship against anti-censorship tools was documented using a combination of our own measurements, OONI Probe, RIPE Atlas, and manual validations. Access to the CNE’s main website was documented primarily through DNS, Ping, and Traceroute measurements from RIPE Atlas, along with manual validations.
The methodological approach used ensures rigorous and replicable documentation of digital censorship, allowing for the recording of blocking and restriction patterns, as well as measuring their impact on the availability of communication platforms and censorship circumvention tools in Venezuela.